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ECONOMIC NEWSLETTER

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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1988

For the second time this year, the Soviets have neglected to publish industrial production figures. Thus, we have no information about production results for October, 1988. In response to a query we printed some time ago, Barbara Severin wrote us a note indicating that the missing statistical data ultimately appeared in an issue of *Vestnik Statistiki*. We will have to wait and see if the data for October subsequently appears in less traditional sources.

LIVESTOCK HERDS

The Soviet Union is still having trouble trying to build up its livestock herds. As the accompanying table indicates, the size in the decline of the cattle herd was greater this year than it was last year. In addition, the number of cows and sheep and goats continues to decline. The number of hogs has increased, although it is still below the November 1, 1986 figure. The only consistant success has been the increase in the chicken flock. This continues to be an area of important concern for the Soviet leadership.

LIVESTOCK HERDS

Herd	Jan-Nov 86	Jan-Nov 87	Jan-Nov 1987 as a % of 1986
Cattle	95.9	95.4	99.5%
Cows	29.2	28.8	98.6
Hogs	62.2	60.1	96.7
Sheep & Goats	118.3	117.6	99.4
Poultry	766.1	783.8	102.3

LIVESTOCK HERDS

Herd	Nov 1 1987	Nov 1 1988	Jan-Nov 1988 as a % of 1986
Cattle	95.4	94.0	98.5%
Cows	28.8	28.5	99.0
Hogs	60.1	60.2	100.2
Sheep & Goats	117.6	117.2	99.7
Poultry	783.8	799.4	102.0

ARDEN HOUSE

The Arden House program is taking shape and will be included in the January issue of the *Economic Newsletter*. We are delighted to announce that Ambassador Jack Matlock has indicated that he will be attending the conference again this year. We have several panels on business trends and prospects confirmed, as well as political restructuring, and foreign policy.

USSR Foreign Exchange Quotations

Currency	27 July	10 Aug	14 Sept	12 Oct	9 Nov
£100 Sterling	108.17	106.80	106.05	106.77	108.12
100 Aust. sch.	4.81	4.73	4.80	4.80	4.86
$100 US	62.06	63.21	62.58	62.54	60.86
100 Fr. Francs	10.02	9.87	9.94	9.89	10.00
1,000¥ Japanese	4.73	4.72	4.69	4.72	4.88
10,000 Italian Lire	4.57	4.51	4.52	4.51	4.59
100 Swiss Francs	40.66	39.87	40.06	39.72	40.77
100 Deutsche Marks	33.82	33.25	33.81	33.73	34.20

CORPORATE SPONSOR SEMINAR ON AGRICULTURE TO BE HELD FEBRUARY 13TH.

Enclosed is the program for our next corporate sponsor seminar. Widespread interest in the reform efforts in Soviet agriculture has prompted us to take another look at Gorbachev's most vexing policy area. With a less than satisfactory harvest anticipated for 1988 (the Soviets have not published a preliminary estimate of the 1988 harvest, contrary to normal practice), this seems like an ideal time to focus on Gorbachev's agriculture and trade policy.

We are still waiting for confirmations from one or two additional speakers, whose names will be listed in the January 1989 newsletter. We think this conference has the makings of a very interesting day.

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CENTERPIECE

The end of the Soviet name game?

By Nina Tumarkin
Special to the Globe

A recent issue of the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya gazeta* reveals that the Soviet Culture Fund, an informal, unofficial body devoted to the protection of Soviet cultural treasures, has recently created a council on toponymy.

A toponym is a place name, and the council has resolved to send an open letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting that historical place names be given the status of "cultural monuments" and thus receive government protection.

The letter also asks the Supreme Soviet to draft a decree restoring the original names after Bolshevik luminaries. These include the cities of Kalinin, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Zhdanov, Kirov, and Voroshilovgrad. They used to be called, respectively, Tver, Nizhnyi Novgorod, Samara, Mariupol, Viatka, and Lugansk.

The signatories of the letter, consummate pragmatists who describe their list as "preliminary and not at all exhaustive," point out that names of several cities should be reinstituted simultaneously, since this would facilitate the printing of new maps and plane and train schedules.

Why did some Russian cities lose their names, and what is the meaning of the current movement to restore them?

St. Petersburg, which was in fact a German appellation, was renamed Petrograd (a russified form of "Peter's city") in a wave of nationalist feeling that swept Imperial Russia and the European continent at the beginning of World War I.

In 1921 the Bolsheviks began to consolidate their rule in a country devastated by World War I, two revolutions, and then a protracted civil war. Like other postrevolutionary regimes, they were unable to establish authority by responding to the actual needs of the social groups that had catapulted them into power: they did not give the workers factories nor did they bestow land upon the long-suffering Russian peasantry. Their business in the early years was to maintain and deepen control in the midst of anarchy. For this they relied heavily on political rituals and symbols of legitimacy, which were the heroes and leaders of the new state – not surprising in a land whose people had for centuries personified temporal and divine power in tsars, emperors, and saints.

Streets and squares, villages and towns were named after Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev during their lifetimes, and when Lenin died prematurely in 1924, Petrograd was renamed Leningrad in a frenzy of enthusiasm for the dead leader that swept the nation.

In the following decades, it became common practice to rename cities after political leaders, mostly but not always after their deaths, both to celebrate publicly the honored individual and as part of a state-building process, a shorthand way of thoroughly appropriating a geographical location. It was like sticking a red flag into the earth and saying "this is ours."

Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad in 1923, when Stalin was still a relatively minor figure, and it was largely because of its name that Hitler made his ill-fated attempt to sieze that city in 1942. After Stalin died, his name was erased even as his busts and statues were toppled from pedestals throughout the country. But in the 1960s it was apparently inappropriate to restore tsarist names. Instead, the city received the politically neutral name Volgograd, after the mighty river on whose shores it is situated.

Now that Brezhnev is out of favor, institutions and places bearing his name have been rushing to get rid of it. The city of Brezhnev is once again called by its old name of Naverezhnye Chelny. A new mood of respect and even reverence for the past would make the adoption of any but that city's original name unthinkable. The toponymy council's letter reflects the current spirit, which regards the destruction of old place names as a violation of something sacred, analogous to the dynamiting of churches in the Stalin era.

UPI file photo

Russian troops patrol tenements in Stalingrad after Germany was defeated in a battle for control of the area in 1942. The city, formerly named Tsaritsyn, was renamed Volgograd in the 1960s.



Lenin

Stalin



Brezhnev

For Americans, place names have always had a certain sanctity. Proud as we may be of our famous daughters and sons, we do *not* express that pride by renaming cities and towns in their honor. Brookline remained Brookline after President Kennedy's death, and would likely have stayed that way if Gov. Michael S. Dukakis, who was also born there, had been elected president.

Unstated rule in US

It looks as though our unstated toponymic rule is that schools, airports, parks, concert halls and other public institutions may bear the names of worthy citizens who have passed on, while cities and towns retain their original names forever. In the early decades of our history we were quick to name new towns and cities after our founding fathers, so we could draw on their authority in perpetuity. But our ancestors did not make it a practice to change the names of existing cities. Perhaps the idea was uncomfortably reminiscent of the military domination implicit in the act, say, of changing Nieuw Amsterdam to New York, as the British did when they replaced Dutch rule.

To many Americans the past Soviet practice of renaming cities, towns and villages seems like a taboo. Indeed, it feels vaguely Orwellian, as though in changing a city's name Soviet authorities were somehow tampering with an eternal truth. War is peace, freedom is slavery, Lugansk is Voroshilovgrad.

Why have we Americans made toponyms sacred? Names are, after all, only words. For one thing, no one profits financially from changing a place name. The money comes when one transforms the place itself by say, building a mall where an old neighborhood once stood. Besides, a name is a legacy; to replace a toponym is to say no to our ancestors. That is precisely what the postrevolutionary Bolshevik regime did with great deliberation in the first decades of its history; by the time Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982 places were named after him by sheer force of habit.

In years past dissidents in Leningrad, as an anti-Soviet act, used to affectionately call their city by the old Russian nickname "Peter." Today many Soviet people, are yearning to reforge their links with generations past. And most of them are not dissidents. Indeed, Raisa Gorbacheva is a member of the Soviet Culture Fund that has established the council on toponymy. The restoration of original toponyms is one way to symbolize a revived veneration for the past and a rejection of the classic postrevolutionary disdain of Russia's history.

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Gorbachev looks for continuity in relations with US

MADELEINE G. KALB

Gary Viskupic Illustration. © Op Art

Reagan was an unlikely partner but, once on board, an enthusiastic one. There are no such assurances about Bush.

An impatient Mikhail Gorbachev has seized the diplomatic initiative once again by inviting himself to the United States in early December to pay a farewell call on President Reagan and renew his acquaintance with President-elect Bush. The news broke the day before British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Reagan's favorite ally, was due to arrive in Washington; West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was already in town.

Gorbachev's message was clear: the Soviet leader, who had just entertained Kohl in Moscow and is scheduled to visit Thatcher in London in mid-December, wants to be in the same league as the key international players who automatically participate in the hail-and-farewell ceremonies of American presidential transitions. He wants to reinforce the legitimacy he won in a dramatic series of summit meetings with the most unlikely American partner possible – the staunchly anticommunist Reagan.

Limited success

With all its uncertainties and potential pitfalls at home, this taming of the president and the establishment of 1960s-style detente has been Gorbachev's only major foreign policy accomplishment so far, and he needs to solidify and institutionalize it.

Gorbachev's limited success has not been for lack of trying. He has been inventive, activist, flexible on all fronts. Yet most of his efforts have not yet borne fruit, and they have often produced unintended consequences. A tour d'horizon suggests a country encircled by disappointments and dangers.

Turning east, Gorbachev faces a dynamic, prosperous noncommunist Asia and a communist China less prosperous, but still a reproach to a moribund Soviet economy. He has appealed to noncommunist Asia with a peace offensive replete with proposals for nuclear-free zones and the removal of all military bases. But the most important player, Japan, with territorial claims against Moscow dating back to World War II, remains suspicious.

He has tried various overtures to China, suggesting a summit and making concessions on the three major issues the Chinese have insisted on as preconditions to a rapprochement: Afghanistan, Cambodia and their common border. He has spoken admiringly of Chinese economic progress, which he is eager to reproduce on the farms of the Soviet Union. China responds politely but without enthusiasm.

His most recent diplomatic destination was India – for decades, Moscow's only noncommunist ally – where he tried to reassure a government alarmed by his overtures to the Chinese.

The prospects in Asia may be disappointing; when he looks south, the view is alarming. The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan – if it continues on schedule – may mollify the Chinese and diminish the hostility of the world's Moslem population, but the near-decade of war has left a legacy of instability. Iran remains a profoundly troubling neighbor, eager to export its brand of Islamic fundamentalism into the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

The proximity of Turkey has always guaranteed Armenia's allegiance to its Russian protector, but long-dormant conflict between Christian Armenians and Moslem Azerbaijanis has flared into unprecedented rioting within the Soviet Union and created strains between both ethnic groups and Moscow.

To the west, in the troubled borderlands, there are rumbles of resurgent nationalism in the Ukraine and startling assertions of autonomy in the three Baltic republics, which have always felt themselves culturally akin to the West. Gorbachev has permitted them a certain amount of leeway, hoping to tap their economic efficiency as a model and inspiration for perestroika in the rest of the country.

The risks of this policy are magnified beyond Soviet borders in Eastern Europe, where Gorbachev has encouraged each country to follow its own socialist path. Eager reformers may wear "I love Gorby" buttons, but the lingering question remains: how far can Poland or Hungary or Czechoslovakia go before the reins are pulled tight again? The dilemma is tougher for Gorbachev than for any previous Soviet leader because his reputation rides on continuing reform.

Gorbachev's greatest success has been in Western Europe, where his detente with the Reagan administration has apparently convinced the population that the Cold War is over and further defense spending is unnecessary. Which brings us full circle, back to the presidential transition.

Contradictory signs

Reagan was an unlikely partner but, once on board, an enthusiastic one. There are no such assurances about Bush. During the campaign the signs were contradictory: on the one hand, a less fervent commitment to SDI, on the other, a tougher, more suspicious attitude toward the Soviet Union. That may have been campaign rhetoric, designed to appeal to the conservative white male voter – but Gorbachev did not want to take any chances.

So, while Bush talked of an orderly process – after he took office in January, Secretary of State James Baker would meet with the NATO allies and then with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadse, and only then would Bush meet with the Soviet president – Gorbachev decided to speed things up. He wants a laying on of hands while Reagan is still there, even though conservative observers regard the arrangement as highly improper.

Although the president and the president-elect regard the meeting as more social than substantive, Gorbachev has a full agenda. He is not only seeking diplomatic respectability; he is hoping for a steady stream of Western credits and technology to smooth the path of perestroika; he wants to push ahead with arms-control agreements that will free up funds now committed to his military budget. But most of all he needs an assurance of stability and continuity in US-Soviet relations so that he can concentrate on the daunting problems he faces at home.

Madeleine G. Kalb is a fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University.

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We also have special **anniversary tee shirts** (crimson, in adult sizes M and L) dedicated to "40 Years of Glasnost'" (1948-1988) at the RRC, and antique white **tote bags** with the same logo.

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Sweatshirts come in adult sizes only.
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	TEE SHIRTS ($10)		CREWNECK SWEATSHIRTS ($15)		HOODED SWEATSHIRTS ($22)	
	Crimson	White	Crimson	White	Crimson	White
Small	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Medium	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Large	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
X-Large	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

TODDLERS' TEE ($4.50) (White only)		YOUTH TEE ($6.50)	Crimson	White	INFANTS' TEE ($4.50) (White only)	
Size 2	_____	6/8	_____	_____	12 mo. only	_____
Size 3	_____	10/12	_____	_____	Infants' bib (white)	_____
Size 4	_____	14/16	_____	_____		

SILK TIE ($25.00) _____ SILK SCARF ($30.00) _____ TOTE BAG ($22.00) _____

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